Home  >  News & Publications  >  Client Alert July 2002 Education & Special Education Client Alert - July 2002 Merav Sharon v. City of Newton, 437 Mass 99 (2002) In a decision issue in the above case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found valid a release signed by the parent of a minor child for the purpose of permitting her to engage in public school extra-curricular sports activities. The Court’s decision reveals that in November of 1995 Merav Sharon was a sixteen-year old student at Newton North High School. She participated on the school’s cheerleading squad and severely injured her right arm during a practice at the school. In November 1998 the student, having reached the age of majority, filed suit against the City of Newton, alleging negligence and negligent hiring and retention of the cheerleading coach. The City filed its answer in December of the same year and discovery began. During the course of discovery the City found a parental consent and release form which was signed by both the student and her father in August 1995, just three months prior to her injury. The form released the City of Newton from all potential liability stemming from any personal injury suffered as a result of athletic participation. The form also excluded the City from any suits arising in connection with said injury, filed either before or after the student reached the age of majority. The City moved for summary judgment based on the signed release. After further preliminary proceedings, the City asked the court to allow it amend its original answer to include the affirmative defense of waiver. A Superior Court judge allowed the amendment in June 2000 and a second judge then granted the City’s motion for summary judgment based on the validity of the release form. The student appealed the ruling, stating three basic objections. She claimed that the first judge abused her discretion by allowing the City to amend its original answer. Second, she argued that summary judgment was inappropriately granted because genuine issues of material fact were still in dispute. Finally, the student stated that the release form that she and her father signed was invalid for several reasons: because she disavowed it upon reaching the age of majority, the release form violated public policy, it was contrary to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, and there was no consideration. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) heard the appeal and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the City of Newton. The student contended that material issues of fact still remained; neither she nor her father understood the implications of signed the release form, and that their understanding was a matter of fact that should be decided by a jury. However, the SJC pointed out that the failure to read or understand a release form does not void its effects. The SJC found that the student and her father had ample opportunity to read and understand the contents of the form. It was a clearly labeled, two-sided document. The student and her father both signed the front of the firm and the student’s father provided additional information on the back, signing that side as well. There were no circumstances that would mislead a person of ordinary intelligence as to whether the form released the City from liability. The student further argued that enforcing the release would violate public policy. The SJC saw this contention as encompassing three separate public policy concerns, namely, that it violates public policy to allow schools to require signed release forms as a prerequisite to participation in extracurricular activities; that public policy dictates that parents should not be allowed to contract away their minor child’s right to sue for future harm; and that to enforce releases undermines the duty of care that public schools owe to their students. After acknowledging its duty to consider the public policies implicated for the City of Newton as well, the SJC discussed each of the concerns in turn. With regard to releases in general, the SJC unequivocally stated that Massachusetts law favors their enforcement so long as they are not accompanied by fraud. Furthermore, they have been upheld in a number of contexts ranging far beyond the purely commercial. The SJC did hint that had a release been required for compelled activities, such as simply attending school, public policy may not favor their enforcement. The student was a willing participant in Newton cheerleading; she was not forced and it was not essential that she be a part of the squad. The public policy of Massachusetts was therefore not offended when the City of Newton required her and her parents to sign a release as a prerequisite to participation in the activity. Turning to the issue of allowing parents to contract away their minor child’s right to sue for future harm, the SJC acknowledged the cases cited by both parties concerning the subject, but decided to rely solely on Massachusetts law. Under the common law, a minor can disaffirm almost any contract that he is a party to provided he does so before reaching the age of eighteen or within a reasonable time thereafter. The student obviously repudiated the release when she sued the City of Newton. The City conceded that she could do this, but claimed that the release remains valid because her father also released the City from liability. The SJC decided that the public policy allowing minors to disaffirm their contracts comported with common sense: minors need to be protected from their own want of sound judgment. According to the court, this purpose is not undermined by allowing a parent to exercise his own sound judgment on behalf of his minor children. Furthermore, the common law of the state presumes that fit parents act within the best interest of their children, giving parents a fundamental right to make decisions regarding their care, custody and upbringing. Once again considering that the activity in question was nonessential, the SJC decided not to disturb the parent’s judgment. These same public policy issues were found to be consistent with encouraging participation in extracurricular activities in general. The SJC claimed that to hold that releases were unenforceable would expose public schools, who offer the majority of extracurricular activities for children, to costs and risks that would inevitably lead to the erosion of the programs. The student argued that enforcing releases conveyed the message that the programs can be run negligently, but the court disagreed. It said that there were many reasons, aside from the liability shield, why a public school would ensure that its programs were well-run, including the fact that they are both owned by and accountable to the citizens of the town in which they are located. Clearly, the SJC’s decision in the Sharon case provides strong incentive for public entities such as school districts to review the use of release in conjunction with their own activities.